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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs 
WADE WILLIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010495-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 is unconstitutional on its face because 
it prohibits mere possession of a firearm? Constitutional challenges to statutes are 
questions of law reviewed by this Court for correctness. State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, ^ 
3, 18 P.3d 500. This issue was preserved in a motion to dismiss (R. 45-124, 191). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 6 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 
1 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 26 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandator}' and prohibitory, unless 
bv express words thev are declared to be otherwise. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) 
A category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses or 
has under his custody or control: any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Wade Willis appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Gary D. Stott, Fourth District Court, after the entry of a conditional plea to the 
charge of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceecngs and Disposition 
Wade Willis was chat tied by information filed in Fourth District Court on August 
15, 2000, with possession ot a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a), and theft, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-404, 412 (R. 2). 
On October 4, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held at which time Willis was 
bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding of probable cause; and pleas of "not 
guilty" were entered upon arraignment (R. 18, 191 at 26). 
On October 11, 2000, Willis filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds that 
the probation search of his residence constituted an illegal warrantless search under the 
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Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 23-29). After a hearing on 
January 2. 200 L Judge Gary D Stott denied the motion (R 42-43, 192J. 
On Januarv 4. 2001. Willis filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is unconstitutional on its face and in violation of the right to 
keep and bear arms set forth in Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution (R. 45-124). On 
February 6, 2001, Judge Stott denied the motion (R. 142-43). 
On March 23, 2001, Willis entered a plea of "guilty" to possession of a firearm by 
a restricted person, a second degree felony, conditioned upon his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss (R. 164-71, 172-74, 177). 
On May 11, 2001, Willis was sentenced to 180-days in the Utah County Jail, 
ordered to pay a fine, and placed on supervised probation for a period of thirty-six 
months (R. 180-82). 
On June 8, 2001, Willis filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court and this 
action commenced (R. 184). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Jonathan Coones testified that he is the owner of a 9-milimeter handgun (R. 191 at 
5). Coones testified that in August of 2000 the gun was kept on the top shelf of a closet 
in his motor home which was located in his backyard in Spanish Fork (R. 191at 5, 7, 10). 
Coones testified that he knows Willis and that Willis was given permission to enter the 
motor home by Coones' mother (R. 191 at 5-6). Sometime later, Coones discovered that 
his gun was missing (R. 191 at 6). Coones asked Willis about the gun but Willis denied 
taking it (R. 191 at 7). At the time, the gun turned up missing the lock on the motor home 
door did not work and a few other people had access to the motor home (R. 191 at 8). 
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Eric Price, an employee of Adult Probation & Parole, testified that he is Willis' 
probation officer and that in August of 2000 Willis was on felony probation for evading a 
police officer, a third degree felony (R. 191 at 15). Price testified that he received a call 
from Detective Mitchell and was informed that Willis was a suspect of a theft of a 
firearm from Coones (R. 191 at 17-18). On August 1, 2000, Price-based on the 
information he received from Mitchell—searched Willis' home located at 1516 South 320 
East in Orem; and was present when a 9-millimeter firearm was found in Willis' 
bedroom closet (R. 191 at 15-16, 18). 
Brad Mitchell, a detective with the Spanish Fork Police Department, testified that 
he investigated a complaint from Coones concerning the missing handgun (R. 191 at 20-
21). Mitchell contacted Adult Probation & Parole and directed them to Willis' home (R. 
191 at 21). The serial number provided by Coones was the same serial number that was 
on the gun found at Willis' residence (R. 191 at 21). Mitchell later interviewed Willis 
and was told that "the handgun was given from Mr. Coones to his mother and that his 
mother had asked him to store the gun in his bedroom for his mother" (R. 191 at 22). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Willis asserts that the plain language of Article I, § 6, as it was amended in 1984, 
provides that an individual's right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, and that it 
grants to the legislature only the power to define the lawful use of arms. Accordingly, 
Willis asserts that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is unconstitutional on its face 
because it infringes on the right of individuals—including Willis—to merely "possess" or 
have "under [their] custody or control" any firearm and subjects them to felony 
prosecution and possible incarceration. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-10-503(2)(a) VIOLATES THE 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO BEAR AND KEEP ARMS SET FORTH IN 
ARTICLE I, § 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Willis asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to dismiss on 
grounds that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) violates his individual right to bear 
and keep arms set forth in Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution because it makes mere 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person a crime. Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-
503(2)(a) essentially reads that any category I restricted person who "purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control" any firearm is guilty of a second 
degree felony." The trial court denied Willis' motion on grounds that this Court in State 
v. In, 2000 UT App 358, 18 P.3d 500, had ruled that this statute "does not 
unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms" and that the statute "only 
restricts [the right to bear arms] under very limited circumstances-such as a felony 
indictment or conviction" (R. 142) (quoting In, 2000 UT 358 at f^ 14). 
Willis asserts that the trial court's interpretation of this Court's holding in In is 
erroneous for the following reasons: 
One, this Court in In specifically did not address the issue of whether the statute as 
it relates to mere possession of a firearm is constitutional on its face. In, 2000 UT App 
358 at 1f 3, n.2. Similarly, this Court in State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 926 (Utah 
App. 1991), refused to reach the merits of a similar constitutional challenge as to 
possession of a weapon by a parolee because the issue was not raised in the trial court 
and did not rise to the level of plain error. Accordingly, contrary to the triarl court's 
ruling, neither this Court-or the Utah Supreme Court-has ever addressed the issue of 
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whether Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) as it relates to mere possession of a 
firearm is unconstitutional on its face in regards to the current plain language of .Article L 
§ 6 of the Utah Constitution. 
Two, in In, the defendant actually used a firearm rather than merely possessing it. 
2000 UT App 358 at j^ 2. The legislature's ability to regulate the use of arms is not 
impeded by the plain language of Article I, § 6. Accordingly, this Court's statement in 
In, 2000 UT App 358 at % 14, that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) fckdoes not 
unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms" because it "only restricts that 
right under very limited circumstances-such as a felony or indictment or conviction" is 
correct as it relates to use of a weapon by a restricted person-which is the factual 
scenario that was presented to this Court in In. Contrary to the trial court's ruling in 
denying Willis' motion to dismiss, this Court in In did not address the constitutionality 
of mere possession of a firearm by a restricted person. 
Willis also asserts that the trial court's interpretation of the plain language of 
Article I, § 6, as it was amended in 1984, is erroneous and his reliance on earlier case law 
such as State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 1974), is misplaced. 
Prior to January 1, 1985, Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution read: "The people 
have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but the Legislature may regulate 
the exercise of this right by law." State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah 1982). Based 
upon this language the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813, 814 
(Utah 1974), held that a statute which made it a class A misdemeanor for non-citizens to 
possess any dangerous weapon did not violate Article I, § 6 because it "is quite evident 
from the language [of the amendment] that the Legislature had sufficient power to enact 
the statute in question." The Court in Beorchia also held that the statute did not violate 
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the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution because "[t]he sale, use and possession of firearms are proper subjects of 
regulation by the State" and ;i[t]he Fourteenth Amendment is not generally applied so as 
to restrict exercise of the police powers of the State." A few years later the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of this same statute under the Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Vlacil, 645 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982). 
The Court concluded that "the right to bear arms under the federal constitution is 
collective rather than individual." 645 P.2d at 679. Based upon this conclusion, the 
Court held that "an individual's right to bear arms is subject to the police power of the 
various states." 645 P.2d at 679. Accordingly, the statute which made it a crime for non-
citizens to possess a dangerous weapon was not prohibited by the Second Amendment 
either. 
After the decisions in Beorchia and Vlacil, the Utah Legislature changed the 
language of Article I, § 6. This constitutional amendment was approved by the electorate 
in November of 1984, and took effect on January 1, 1985. Article I, § 6 of the Utah 
Constitution, as it was so amended, reads: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense 
of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes 
shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from 
defining the lawful use of arms. 
Willis asserts that this amendment clarifies that the right to bear and possess arms 
under the state constitutional is an individual right rather than a collective one. In 
addition, whereas prior to the 1984 amendment, the Legislature had the ability to 
"regulate the exercise" of the right to bear arms by law, now the Legislature only has the 
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ability to "defin[e] the lawful use of arms" (emphasis added). Therefore, Willis asserts 
that the plain language of .Article L § 6 of the Utah Constition prevents the legislature 
from limiting or restricting an individual's right to possess and keep firearms. Moreover, 
"In considering the meaning of a constitutional provision, a court must begin its analysis 
with the plain language of the provision and need not look beyond the plain language 
unless some ambiguity is found." Utah School Boards Ass 'n v. Utah State Bd. Of 
Education, 2001 UT 2,1f 13, 17 P.3d 1125 (quoting In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 
(Utah 1996). Because the plain language of Article I, § 6 provides that an individual's 
right to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, and because the plain language also 
grants to the legislature only the power to define the lawful use of arms, Willis asserts 
that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) is unconstitutional on its face because it 
infringes on the right of individuals-including Willis—to merely "possess" or have 
"under [their] custody or control" any firearm and subjects them to felony prosecution 
and possible incarceration. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Willis asks that this Court reverse his conviction of 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person on the grounds that Utah Code Annotated § 
76-10-503(2)(a) as it relates to mere possession of a firearm violates Article I, §6 of the 
Utah Constitution. Willis further asks that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District 
with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn, and the matter dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBiMITTED this *23day of December, 2001. 
Margaret^ P. Lindsay U 
Counsel for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this ? 3 day of December. 
2001. 
•-"7. 
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ADDENDA 
10 
JARED \V. ELDRIDGE (SI76) 
Attorney for Defendant J*- •; ^ ' - ^ 
ITAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOC. *' "' ° C ^ j '#1 
245 North University Ave 
TeleDhone: 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT, IN 
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
WADE LEON WILLIS, Case No. 001403071 
JUDGE STOTT 
Defendant. : 
The defendant, WADE LEON WILLIS, through counsel JARED W. ELDRIDGE hereby 
moves to dismiss the prosecution of Count I on the grounds that §76-10-503(2)(a) prohibiting the 
possession of dangerous weapons by a restricted person, violates the state constitutional right to keep 
and bear arms. 
DATED this 3 day of January, 2001. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
JARED W. ELDRIDGE 
Attorned for Defendant 
.TARED W. ELDRJDGE (SI76) 
Attorney for Defendant 
UT \H COUNTY PL'BLIC DEFENDER ASSOC 
245 North Uni\ ersitv Ave. 
Telephone: 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT, IN 
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff. : 
vs. : 
WADE LEON WILLIS, Case No. 001403071 
JUDGE STOTT 
Defendant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTE P JHIBITING PEOPLE ON PROBATION OR PAROLE FOR 
ANY FELONY FP <M POSSESSING A DANGEROUS WEAPON VIOLATES THE 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
Possession of weapons for any lawful purpose is protected by the 1985 revision of Article 
I Section 6 of the Utah Constitution which reads: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security 
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as 
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein 
shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 
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The statute with which Mr. Willis is charged §76-10-503(2)(a) purports to penalize mere 
possession of weapons without any regard to the use or purpose of the weapon. It reads: 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony 
This issue was argued but not decided in State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, (Utah App. 
1991). (attached) The court, at 926, declined to reach the merits of a similar constitutional challenge 
as to parolees because the issue was not raised in the trial court. The appellate court held that failure 
of the trial court to have recognized the unconstitutionality of the statute was not plain error. The 
Court of Appeals found no plain error holding that the new amendment to Article I, §6 of the Utah 
Constitution did not obviously invalidate prior Utah authority approving restrictions of weapon 
possession. 
Although the Archambeau court was correct that such statutes had previously been approved, 
it incorrectly discounted the Legislative history of this amendment which is attached hereto and 
incorporated by reference.x The debate regarding the amendment indicates that the amendment was 
1
 Reference to the legislative history (in Appendix 1) is not dispositive. It appears 
that when the amendment process began, the legislators desired to insure a state individual right 
to keep and bear arms (House floor debates on Senate Joint Resolution No, 2, 3/7/83 pages 1-3). 
It appears that the amendment was not studied by the Judiciary Interim Study Committee 
or by the Constitutional Study and Revision Commission (House floor debates on Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 2, 3/7/83 pages 4-5, 9-10; minutes of the Constitutional Revision Committee, 
5/25/84 page 2). 
The voter information pamphlet for November 6, 1984 indicates in the "Arguments For" 
section that "convicted felons, mental incompetents, minors, and illegal aliens would not be 
guaranteed" the right to keep and bear arms. Pamphlet page 28. In the "Rebuttal To" section, 
the author warns that the language of the amendment itself makes no mention of classes of 
people who are not protected by the amendment. Id. 
Additional history of the amendment is found in "The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An 
Illusory Public Pacifier?", 1986 Utah L.Rev. 751, 751-755 and accompanying notes. 
i 9 ; 
passed in an effect to ''overrule" and nullify the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Vlacil. 
645 P.2 69". (Utah 19S2) which held that the right to bear arms was a collective rathe: than an 
II THE COURT SHOULD RELY ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION IN STRIKING THIS STATUTE DOWN AS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
While the Utah Constitution allows for legislation defining the lawful use of weapons, it 
flatly prohibits legislation infringing on the individual right to keep and bear arms for any lawful 
purpose. It states: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security 
and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as 
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein 
shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 6 (1985 version in 1990 supp.). 
This Court must strike the statute purporting to penalize mere possession of dangerous 
weapons because it infringes the individual right to keep and bear arms and does not define a lawful 
(or unlawful) use of arms. 
Reference to basic tenets of federalism and Utah constitutional construction, establish that 
this argument is properly raised for this Court's adjudication. 
A. PRINCIPLES OF FEDERALISM CALL FOR A RULING UNDER THE STATE 
CONSTITUTION 
As is discussed more fully below, basic tenets of federalism call for this Court to enforce the 
Utah Constitution in answering this question of state law. 
The United States of America is a federation of state governments. The states preceded the 
federation and hold general, residual powers to govern, which are limited only by the state and 
i 
A O 
federal constitutions. In contrast, the federal government's powers are limited to those enumerated 
in the federal constitution. See e.g. Constitution of Utah States, Amendment X. This federalist form 
o f g o y e i p j \ ^ 
historical trust and empowerment ot local government to represent ana serve tne citizens or eacn 
state. See e ^ Manning v. Sevier County 517 P.2d 549, 553-554 (Utah 1973) Crockett, J. 
concurring, joined by Ellett J., Henriod, J.). 
Federalist reliance on local government and limitation of centralized government is reflected 
in the differences between state and federal constitutions. State constitutions are tailored to the 
regions they govern; they are detailed and specific; they are dynamic. On the other hand, the federal 
constitution is uniform, general, and unchanging. Compare the frequently amended Utah 
Constitution with the federal constitution. See also Utah Code Ann. Section 63-54-1 et seq. (Utah 
Constitution Revision Study Commission created to study Utah Constitution, inform governor and 
legislature of needed changes). 
Federalism is a principle that is important in Utah. The people of this state historically have 
cherished local government and fought to limit federal intrusion into questions of state law. E.g. L.J. 
Arrington and D. Bitton, The Mormon Experience, 161-184. Our state Supreme Court was perhaps 
the last state court to accept "incorporation" of provisions of the federal Bill of Rights. See e.g. 
Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549,553 (Utah 1973)(Crockett, J. concurring, jointed by Ellett, 
J., Henriod, J.) (federal incorporation doctrine is disingenuous, violative of principles of federalism; 
first amendment to United States Constitution does not apply to state actors). 
The question raised in this case, whether individual citizens should be allowed to possess 
weapons, is a question of state law. While the federal constitution does have a provision referring 
to a right to bear arms, that provision applies exclusively to federal government - not state 
4 
go\ernmert E g State \ Vlacil 645 P 2d 677, 679 (Utah 1982) The federal provision refers to 
a LOilecu c uV wlvJi doe^ i ^ p»oteci individual ]V Tie leueia provioior is mic-pietou 
narrowlv as facilitating militias Id. 
Utah, like many other states has a state constitutional provision protecting the individual 
right to keep and bear armb Constitution of Ltah, .Article I section 6 (19S5, in 1990 Supp ) : The 
language of the current constitutional pro\ lsion relating to the indi\ ldual right to keep and bear arms 
wajj passed bv a strong majority of the Ltah legislature after \ ears of negotiation and revision 'The 
Individual Right to Bear Arms An Illusor> Public Pacifier0", 1986 Utah L Rev 751, 753-754 
nn 13 (attached) The language of the current constitutional prov lsion relating to the indiv ldual nght 
to keep and bear arms was passed b> a strong majority of the Utah voters Id At n 12 
Basic principles of federalism call on this Court to recognize and follow this constitutional 
provision in deciding this case 
B. PRINCIPLES OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION CALL FOR A 
RULING UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION 
Mr Willis' argument that the statute penalizing the mere possession of weapons violates the 
plain language of the Utah Constitution comports with the Utah Constitutional rule that the Utah 
Constitution is to be applied in accordance with its express terms Article I section 26 of the Utah 
Constitution provides 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, 
unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise 
Article I section 26 (1953) 
2
 Reference to other state constitutional provisions and decisions is not helpful, Utah's 
provision is unique and apparently the broadest in the nation See Appendix 2 (containing 
provisions from other state constitutions) 
•=5 
us Article I section 26 of the Utah Constitution (requinng literal interpretation of Utah Constitution) 
and Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution (requiring separation of judicial, legislate e, and 
e\ecuti\ e pow ers) require this Court to give effect to the plain language of .Article I section 6 (1985) 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument and authonties Mr Willis respectfully requests this Court to 
dismiss Count I, unlawful possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, on the ground 
that the statute violates his individual right to bear arms as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. 
DATED this 2 day of October, 2000. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
JAREDIW. EfcDRIDGE 
Attorned for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Utah County Attorney's 
Office,150 East Center, Provo, Utah 84601, this day of January, 2001. 
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The argument that the plain language of the Utah Constitution should be given effect is also 
consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, which is expIicitK recognized in the Utah 
Constitution. Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 (1953). Sutherland explains how judicial 
allegiance to the plain language enacted by the legislature is required by the doctrine of separation 
of powers: 
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a 
statute is based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 
The courts owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a 
legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence 
of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to 
give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature. The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court 
has captured this idea in the following language: "It is an elementary 
proposition that courts only determine by construction the scope and 
intent of the law when the law itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a 
law is plain and within the legislative power, it declares itself and 
nothing is left for interpretation. It is as binding upon the court as 
upon every citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to say that the 
law must mean something different from the common import of its 
language, because the court may think that its penalties are unwise or 
harsh would make the judicial superior to the legislative branch of the 
government, and practically invest it with the lawmaking power. The 
remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation but in amendment or 
repeal." 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction,$46.03 
While this Court may deem the constitutional amendment of Article I section 6 unwise, or 
even dangerous, judicial compensation is not the answer. If the legislature wants to penalize 
offenders for possessing weapons, the legislature needs to propose an amendment to the constitution 
and submit it to the electorate. 
If this Court were to save the statute penalizing mere possession of weapons by offenders by 
finding that, in defining lawful use of arms under Article I section 6, the legislature may proscribe 
mere possession, the constitutional right to keep and bear arms would be an empty shell for all of 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
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vs. 
WADE LEON WILLIS, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 001403071 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed January 4, 2001, and his 
accompanying memorandum in support thereof The State filed an Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss, and the Defendant filed a Response. 
Defendant moves to dismiss Count I of this prosecution on the grounds that U.C.A. § 76-
10-503(2)(a) violates Defendant's right to keep and bear arms pursuant to Article I, Section 6 of 
the Utah Constitution. This provision of the Utah Constitution reads: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of 
self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall 
not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the 
lawful use of arms. 
The Defendant argues that a portion of the statute under which Defendant was charged is at odds 
with this provision of the Utah Constitution, and is therefore unconstitutional. Defendant was 
charged under U.C.A. § 76-10-503(2)(a), which reads: 
(2) Any Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony. 
Defendant maintains that the Utah Constitution has granted the legislature the power to regulate 
the use of firearms, but not the possession of firearms. Defendant asserts that this statute is 
unconstitutional, because it prohibits the mere possession of a firearm, the crime with which 
Defendant was charged in Count I. 
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The recent case of State v. In 2000 UT App. 358, addresses the constitutionality of 
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a) in light of Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution. The Appellate 
Court noted that u[w]hen addressing [constitutional challenges], this court presumes that the 
statute is valid, and [resolves] any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Id The court 
then concluded that the statute "does not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear 
arms. This statute only restricts that right under very limited circumstances—such as a felony 
indictment or conviction. Such restrictions are constitutional." Id (citations omitted). The court 
further cited State v. Beorchia. 530 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1974), as holding that this statute is a 
proper exercise of State police powers. 
In light of this recent appellate decision, the Court holds that the restrictions contained in 
U.C.A.§ 76-10-503(2)(a), including the restriction of mere possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, do not unconstitutionally interfere with one's right to bear arms because the statute only 
restricts that right under very limited circumstances. Defendant's Motion is Dismiss is therefore 
denied. 
DATED this ^ day of _ . 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
GARYD. STOTT, JUDGE „ • / V | 
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